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Dworkinian Interpretivism after the Institutional Turn 
Dimitris Tsarapatsanis, Lecturer in Law  
University of Sheffield 
 
Introduction  
 
Dimitrios KyritsisÕ book Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory 
(Hart Publishing 2015) is a substantial contribution to on-going debates in legal theory. 
The main thesis of the book, forcefully argued by the author, is that an interpretivist 
position along roughly Dworkinian lines not only has the conceptual resources to grapple 
with the difference that various kinds of collaborating institutions make to legal practice 
by appealing to normative considerations of institutional design largely pertaining to 
separation of powers principles, but that it may also occupy a position of advantage when 
it comes to explaining the institutional nature of law vis--vis its main rival, legal 
positivism. This thesis is both original and surprising, insofar as it is a well-established 
habit of thought to consider that one of the explanatory advantages of positivist theories 
is, precisely, their ability to better account for the institutional structure of law than their 
main anti-positivist rivals. Importantly, Kyritsis subjects Dworkinian interpretivism to a 
much-needed institutional turn. He maintains that, in order to account for the existence of 
a multiplicity of collaborating institutions and to elucidate the crucial concept of 
jurisdiction that helps make sense of it, interpretivism has to undergo a series of 
transformations. These include, non-exhaustively, substituting the notion of separation of 
powers for that of integrity, abandoning a narrowly court-centric view of the law in 
favour of a systemic one and providing a plausible epistemological story about how 
different kinds of institutions can have access to interpretively construed legal content. 
KyritsisÕ overall ambition is to help transcend the apparent deadlock of a by now 
well-known dialectic consisting in familiar abstract moves and countermoves in the 
debate between positivist and anti-positivist theories of law, by testing both on the new 
and relatively underexplored battleground of institutional interaction. In the very opening 
pages of the book, Kyritsis gives voice to the sense shared by many that continued 
investment of intellectual resources in the Hart/Dworkin debate yields increasingly 
diminishing theoretical returns. Kyritsis urges us, instead, to focus on particular areas of 
law, in order to investigate how well different theories fare. This is as it should be, since 
we have reason to believe that theory choice in law, like theory choice elsewhere, should 
be evaluated holistically: choosing (a version of) positivism versus (a version of) anti-
positivism should be ultimately guided by the fruitfulness of the respective research 
programmes when it comes to explaining and justifying a wide range of pertinent legal 
phenomena. The critical part of KyritsisÕ book thus consists precisely in a series of 
carefully crafted arguments to the effect that influential positivist theories, such as Joseph 
RazÕs, have trouble explaining collaboration between legislatures and courts, as 
compared to an institutionally sensitive Dworkinian interpretivism. The hope 
underpinning KyritsisÕ project is that future debates in legal theory could move to 
encompass more terrains of particular jurisprudence in both public and private law, thus 
testing rival theories across the board and not just at an overtly abstract level.   
In this short contribution I do not wish to probe the extent to which KyritsisÕ 
critical arguments against positivism succeed. Instead, I shall focus on further developing 
the epistemological aspect of an interpretivist view of institutional collaboration along 
lines that are inspired and, I hope, could be accepted by, Kyritsis himself. My aim is to 
show that, though it may seem rather remote from DworkinÕs initial version, KyritsisÕ 
recasting of interpretivism can answer an important objection to which DworkinÕs 
version appears prima facie vulnerable. My aim is thus to provide further motivation for 
developing the institutional reworking of interpretivism initiated by Kyritsis as part of a 
larger project of internal growth of the interpretivist research programme. Throughout, 
references of page numbers are to KyritsisÕ book.      
 
An Epistemic Challenge to Dworkinian Interpretivism 
The objection that I have in mind can be expressed in the following way. DworkinÕs 
initial formulation of interpretivism roughly asserts that the law consists in the set of 
principles that both fit and justify the past political practice of a given community. 
Moreover, Dworkin himself explicitly framed his interpretivism in court-centric terms, 
giving the impression to many, and first and foremost to his positivist objectors, that he 
was in reality advancing not a theory of law, but a theory of how the law should be 
interpreted from the point of view of the judge (as we shall see later on, and despite the 
existence of considerable agreement to this effect, I shall suggest that this should not be 
thought to be the same as a theory of adjudication or of how judges should decide cases). 
Abstracting for now from the twin problems of how best to understand the dimensions of 
ÔfitÕ and ÔjustificationÕ as well as DworkinÕs court-centrism (on which see the extremely 
penetrating critical remarks by Kyritsis on p.57-68 and 95-104 respectively), DworkinÕs 
version of interpretivism makes the content of the law dependent on Ôthe entire political 
history of the legal system to which [the judge] belongsÕ (p.95). This appears to present 
interpretivism with the following problem. If we suppose that the content of the law 
depends on constructive interpretations of the totality of the political history of the 
systems to which judges belong, how could the latter ever realistically undertake such a 
formidable task? More specifically, under what conditions could the interpretive facts to 
which DworkinÕs theory makes reference be epistemically accessible to judges, given the 
judgesÕ actual (as opposed to ideal) cognitive capacities? Call this the epistemic challenge 
to Dworkinian interperetivism. A fuller way of articulating the challenge is as follows. 
It is almost unanimously thought (barring certain extreme legal realist theories 
that view judges as pervasive law-makers) that judges are, at least in part, in the business 
of identifying the truth-values of singular propositions of law. Different theories of law 
identify the facts determining those truth-values in different ways. However, no matter 
how truth-values are considered to be determined, it is natural to suppose that, in order to 
achieve the epistemic goal of accurately apprehending the pertinent facts, judges need to 
deploy appropriate epistemic means. Following Bishop and Trout
1
, we may call the 
epistemic means that judges deploy to this effect Ôreasoning strategiesÕ in a large sense, 
taking care to note that these comprise not only acts of reasoning, such as making 
appropriate inferences and moving in a logically correct manner between propositions, 
but also concrete ways of gathering various kinds of empirical information. Now, it 
appears reasonable to impose two kinds of normative constraints on the acceptability of 
judgesÕ reasoning strategies. First, they ought to be reliable, i.e. such as to allow agents to 
systematically track the relevant facts. This follows from the fact that typically the 
epistemic goal of judges is the truth about propositions of law and not some other aim, 
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such as simple justifiability or reasonableness. Second, they ought to be tractable, i.e. 
suitable for judges as epistemic agents endowed with finite cognitive resources. This 
second dimension of evaluation of reasoning strategies is particularly important, since it 
points to what philosopher Christopher Cherniak has called the Ôfinitary predicamentÕ
2
 of 
human epistemic agents, to wit, the fact that their cognitive resources are limited. 
Human agentsÕ rationality, insofar as it is dependent on finite cognitive resources, 
has been variously called resource-dependent or bounded. Bounded rationality 
approaches, whether in law or in other domains such as economics, focus on how agents 
with limited information, time and cognitive capacities ought to make judgments and 
decisions. The approaches became particularly prominent after the 1970s, when an 
impressive array of experimental results indicated that, under various kinds of 
circumstances, agents reason in ways that systematically violate formal canons of 
rationality. Bounded rationality models attribute at least part of the explanation for these 
shortcomings to the scarcity of cognitive resources available to human agents. Mapping 
out the actual limits of these resources is an important part of cognitive science and 
empirical psychology. Both conceptualize the mind as a finite information-processing 
device, strictly limited with regard to its memory, attention and computation capacities. 
Bounded rationality accounts ask which reasoning strategies agents with finite cognitive 
resources ought to follow in order to reliably attain specified epistemic goals for different 
kinds of environments. Reasoning strategies thus identified are typically resource-
relative: they are tailored to the actual cognitive abilities and resources of human agents. 
Now, resource-relativity as a normative constraint on the selection of reasoning 
strategies can be justified in two ways. The first appeals to ought-implies-can 
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considerations: it is not reasonable to ask of agents that they comply with epistemic 
norms, compliance with which is impossible, given the agentsÕ actual cognitive setup. 
Whilst a lot could be said on how best to unpack what the ÔcanÕ of Ôought-implies-canÕ 
means, it seems to clearly rule out certain kinds of reasoning strategies, such as those that 
are computationally intractable. The second appeals to cost/benefit considerations. It 
follows from resource-relativity that reasoning strategies come at varying costs, some 
being more expensive than others. As an example, take time. Suppose that part of the 
difficulty of deciding some cases stems from the fact that complex consequences have to 
be taken into account, which judges do not have enough time to calculate (abstracting 
from issues of expertise). If judges had infinite time, they could arguably score better on 
the reliability dimension. However, judges do not have infinite time and, in fact, they are 
under relentless time pressure, amplified by the ever-increasing volume of their caseload. 
So depending on the circumstances in which they are placed, we might think that judges 
can sometimes justifiably trade off marginal increases in reliability for speed, by 
following appropriate reasoning strategies (e.g. a more deferential and less fine-grained 
standard of review). Generalizing the point, we might say that it is not enough that 
reasoning strategies score high on the reliability dimension: it is important that they also 
come at an acceptable cost with regard to the finite epistemic resources of judges. The 
upshot for the purposes of the present discussion is that reasoning strategies ought to take 
account of judgesÕ epistemic resources limitations. Even if the relevant facts, whatever 
they happen to be, would in principle be accessible to resource-independent agents, we 
still ought to ask, first, whether they are they also in principle accessible to resource-
dependent judges and, second, at what cost. Incidentally, the cost of reasoning strategies 
is at least one kind reason for which a theory of adjudication is not just a theory of 
interpretation of the law from the point of view of judges. Insofar as decision-making by 
courts is not a theoretical but an eminently practical enterprise, the way real flesh-and-
blood judges are able to reliably and at acceptable epistemic cost discover facts 
determining the truth-values of particular propositions of law entails that the question 
Ôhow should judges decide casesÕ does not automatically come off from an answer to the 
question Ôhow should the law be interpreted from the point of view of the judgeÕ. 
With this brief discussion of epistemic resource-relativity in place, it should be 
clear what the issue with DworkinÕs version of interpretivism is. If the interpretive facts 
on which the truth of singular propositions of law depends comprise not just mind-
independent moral facts (access to which poses special epistemological problems of its 
own that I shall not be touching upon in this discussion) but also an interpretive 
reconstruction, in light of those moral facts, of the totality of past political decisions, then 
the question arises of the reasoning strategies via which judges can have access to these 
facts. How could a judge, alone or working on a panel with other judges, ever hope to 
discharge the task of interpreting under the normative guidance of integrity every single 
past political decision that can have an impact on the truth of propositions of law that she 
articulates as Dworkin seems to maintain? And if that is not part of her proper job 
description then what is? Plainly, introducing a fictional ideal judge such as Hercules is 
here to no avail, since the question is to do with how finite, flesh-and-blood judges, can 
devise reliable and tractable reasoning strategies. At best, DworkinÕs formulation of 
interpretivism ignores the question. At worst, it leaves the impression that the 
epistemological question should be treated in tandem with the metaphysical one about the 
grounds of the truth-values of propositions of law. But then Dworkin is left vulnerable to 
the objection that his interpretivism flouts the tractability constraint. It is in this vein, for 
example, that Brian Leiter accuses Dworkinian interpretivism of being Ôunusable by real 
judgesÕ.
3
 Likewise, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have criticised Dworkin for 
disregarding Ôjudicial capacitiesÕ.
4
   
 
KyritsisÕ Answer to the Epistemic Challenge: from Individual Interpreters to 
Moralised Institutional Collaboration  
 
It is at this point that KyritsisÕ version of institutional interpretivism provides an original 
and much needed answer to the epistemic challenge. His answer comprises two distinct 
but interrelated components. First, Kyritsis urges that interpretivism move away from a 
court-centric view of law and towards a systemic understanding of the joint project of 
governing, which is crucially based on the collaboration of a multiplicity of institutional 
actors. Call this the institutional component of KyritsisÕ interpretivism. Second, Kyritsis 
remains an interpretivist, insofar as he views the institutional component through the lens 
of a theory of systemic legitimacy. Thus, reasons of institutional design, and first and 
foremost of separation of powers, are full-blown normative reasons of political morality 
that can justify a project of governing by inter alia identifying the proper content of the 
concept of jurisdiction. Call this the interpretivist component of KyritsisÕ interpretivism. 
My claim is that, taken together, these two components provide the abstract form of a 
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convincing answer to the epistemic challenge while, at the same time, amounting to a 
significant reworking of Dworkinian interpretivism. 
To begin with, the institutional/systemic component entails that judges, and in 
fact all kinds of legal officials, act in a context of division of labour that also comprises 
other officials. The possibility is thus opened up, which in fact corresponds to many 
actual practices of the legal systems with which we are familiar, of a division of 
epistemic labour whereby some officials systematically rely on the epistemic 
contributions of others in the identification of the truth-values of propositions of law 
(p.124). Kyritsis himself notes a number of epistemic devices used by judges, such as 
deference to other branches of government or judicial doctrines that can be justified on a 
rule-consequentialist basis, insofar as they provide reasoning strategies that can track the 
truth of interpretive facts indirectly and without relying on the reasons on which they are 
based. I would add that these reasoning strategies might also typically comprise recourse 
to rule-formulations provided by legislatures. On an institutional epistemic reading, we 
might think that something like the Ômodel of rulesÕ, under which the legal system is 
represented as a collection of distinct legal norms created by various officials, may well 
survive as a more-or-less reliable heuristic used by judges and other epistemically 
resource-constrained actors, justified as it were partly on consequentialist epistemic 
grounds of reliable truth-tracking, despite the fact that it may well fail as a metaphysical 
explanation of the grounds of the law.  
Furthermore, because the metaphysical level of the grounds of law and the 
epistemological one of efficient reasoning strategies come apart, institutional 
interpretivism does not have to view the function of legal rules through the lens of the all-
or-nothing conceptual straightjacket of pre-emption, as positivist theories typically do. It 
thus retains a considerable degree of flexibility that can enable it to explain reflexive 
Ôprotestant attitudesÕ towards the law, whether adopted by judges or by simple citizens 
(p.145-147). At the same time, institutional interpretivism can account for the many 
instances in which actors simply rely on the heuristic of rule-formulations: here again, the 
reflexivity evinced by the protestant attitude does not have to be a quality of some 
particular actor, but the systemic product of epistemic collaboration (which may well take 
the form of contestation) between a plurality of actors. Overall, the institutional 
component of KyritsisÕ interpretivism can thus account well for the tractability constraint 
on judgesÕ (and othersÕ) reasoning strategies. 
Moreover, and concomitantly, KyritsisÕ second component guarantees that 
tractability of reasoning strategies will not come at the cost of normative blindness. In 
fact, the selection of reasoning strategies has itself to be justified by recourse to reasons 
of political morality and, crucially, of the combination of reasons of content and 
considerations of institutional design. It is here that KyritsisÕ version of interpretivism 
can prove to be particularly useful, since not only is it compatible with the tractability 
constraint, but it can also direct us to track normative institutional reasons that underpin 
the reliability requirement. These reasons may make it, for example, mandatory for 
certain officials (e.g. judges) to perform certain kinds of reasoning (e.g. independent 
assessment of what some constitutional right entails), even if that assessment will come at 
a cost to reliability. Whether they ought to or not will depend on a normative 
specification of the officialsÕ duties within the joint project. On this view, reliability is not 
a consideration external to judicial practices, whose sole function is to truthfully track 
legal content, but also part of the wider network of values of institutional design that 
inform the judicial role. Institutional interpretivism can thus provide a general normative 
framework for assessing both tractability and cost/benefit considerations, as these were 
identified above. By the same token, it deflects accusations of institutional blindness  la 
Sunstein and Vermeule and significantly enriches the interpretivist research programme. 
We can only hope that the opportunities provided by this conceptual enrichment will be 
taken up by others to further holistically probe the programmeÕs fruitfulness and 
explanatory power on the terrain of particular jurisprudence.  
